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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
Why  have  patterns  of  healthcare  spending  varied  during  the  Great  Recession?  Using
cross-national,  harmonised  data  for 27 EU countries  from  1995  to 2011,  we  evaluated
political,  economic,  and health  system  determinants  of  recent  changes  to  healthcare  expen-
diture. Data  from  EuroStat,  the  IMF,  and  World  Bank  (2013  editions)  were  evaluated  using
multivariate  random-  and  ﬁxed-effects  models,  correcting  for pre-existing  time-trends.
Reductions  in  government  health  expenditure  were  not  signiﬁcantly  associated  with  mag-
nitude of  economic  recessions  (annual  change  in GDP,  p = 0.31,  or  cumulative  decline,
p = 0.40  or  debt  crises  (measured  by  public  debt  as  a percentage  of  GDP,  p =  0.38 or per
capita,  p  =  0.83)).  Nor did ideology  of  governing  parties  have  an  effect.  In contrast,  each
$100  reduction  in  tax revenue  was associated  with  a $2.72  drop  in  health  spending  (95%
CI:  $1.03–4.41).  IMF  borrowers  were  signiﬁcantly  more  likely  to  reduce  healthcare  budgetsealthcare than non-IMF  borrowers  (OR  =  3.88,  95% CI: 1.95  –7.74),  even  after  correcting  for  potential
confounding  by indication.  Exposure  to lending  from  international  ﬁnancial  institutions,
tax  revenue  falls,  and  decisions  to  implement  cuts correlate  more  closely  than  underlying
economic  conditions  or orientation  of political  parties  with  healthcare  expenditure  change
es.
hors.  P  in EU member  stat
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. Introduction
Virtually all European countries have experienced eco-
omic recessions since 2007. Those nations with large
nancial centres, including the UK, were among the ﬁrst
o be affected, with many other nations’ banking sectors
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soon caught in the ensuing turmoil. In several, politicians
used large ﬁnancial stimulus packages to bail out banks,
absorbing their debts into the public sector’s balance sheet.
In parallel, recessions led to increasing job losses and falling
incomes, leading to declining consumer spending and asso-
ciated tax revenues. This resulted in large increases in
government deﬁcits (where annual government spending
exceeded revenues), increasing national public debts. How
best to respond to these combined threats of large falls in
output, unemployment, and escalating debts and deﬁcits
has been a topic of vociferous debate.
The European Commission, European Central Bank,
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.and International Monetary Fund (so-called ‘troika’),
along with leaders of many European nations, placed an
explicit priority on deﬁcit reduction. In a letter to Europe’s
ﬁnance ministers on 13th Feb 2013 the European Union’s
er CC BY-NC-ND license. 
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Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs, Ollie
Rehn, wrote that “when public debt levels rise above
90% they tend to have a negative impact on economic
dynamism” [1]. Concerns were widespread that high levels
of debt could trigger declines in economic growth [2], as
well as lead to costly, unsustainable debt repayments.
To reduce deﬁcits, governments began implementing
austerity programmes, so named because they typically
involve budget cuts. However, austerity measures also
may  include policies that increase taxes on corporations,
individual or household incomes, value-added or sales
taxes, and other forms of taxation.
Why  are some EU policymakers making large cuts to
healthcare spending while others are not? It has been
hypothesised that larger economic shocks, such as GDP
falls, unemployment, and debt, may  trigger policymakers
to make deep healthcare cuts [3]. Yet, a brief look at
cross-national data in Europe shows that there is no
inevitable relationship between recessions and healthcare
cuts. When comparing the size of the economic reces-
sions that began in 2007, deﬁned as the peak-to-trough
change in GDP, with the subsequent magnitude of budget
cuts, reﬂecting the delay in budget cycles, there is little
or no obvious correlation [4]. Take Austria and Germany,
for example. Both experienced recessions of similar size
and timing (2008–2009), yet Austria saw reduced govern-
ment spending on health, of US$90.1 per capita, adjusted
for purchasing-power and inﬂation, while Germany saw an
increase of US$57.4 per capita. As Fig. 1 demonstrates, pol-
icymakers have made widely differing budgetary choices
about health expenditures in response to these down-
turns [5–8]. Some countries have allowed total spending
to rise in the face of increasing population needs, in spite
of budgetary pressures from rising deﬁcits and debts.
Another group of countries has speciﬁcally allowed health-
care expenditure to rise, a measure that would facilitate
improvement in the quality and accessibility of health ser-
vices while fostering economic growth [9]. Yet a third group
of governments, potentially inﬂuenced by an inﬂuential
consensus among international institutions that ﬁscal con-
solidation would promote future growth, appears to have
substantially reduced government spending [10,11].
This large variation in political responses to a European-
wide economic shock creates a quasi-natural experiment
for understanding the political economy of healthcare bud-
get allocations. While currency ﬂuctuations may  account
for some of the variation among countries outside the Euro-
zone, some countries (e.g., Iceland, Greece, Ireland, UK,
Spain, Slovenia and Spain) implemented large reductions in
spending on health, while others (e.g., Netherlands, France,
and Switzerland) have allowed real levels of spending to
increase (Fig. 1; see Web  Appendix 1). However intuitive it
may  seem that recessions lead to cuts, these data indicate
that there is scope for different policy choices, with recent
research showing that the depth of recession does not seem
to correspond directly to changes in health expenditure
[12].Previous research has identiﬁed at least four further
explanations beyond the depth of recession for how health-
care budgets will be affected by an economic crisis. First,
a ‘visibility’ hypothesis suggests that cuts to prominentcy 115 (2014) 1–8
areas of public spending, such as health, will be politically
unpopular and less likely to be implemented in periods of
retrenchment [13]. Summarising previous episodes of ﬁs-
cal retrenchment in Europe during the 1980s and 1990s,
Pierson observes that because healthcare spending is
highly visible, accounting for >10% of GDP in almost all
European countries, and is used by virtually all the pop-
ulation, “governments generally found health care to be a
cause of political headaches rather than a target for suc-
cessful retrenchment” [14]. Second, the ideology of the
governing political parties has been proposed to shape
budgetary responses to recessions. For example, while left-
leaning parties may  be more likely maintain safety net
programs through increased government spending, right-
leaning parties may prioritise deﬁcit and debt reduction
by shrinking the role of the state, including health sys-
tem spending [15]. Thus, this “party hypothesis” suggests
that reductions in healthcare spending are more likely to
occur when the majority party in power has a right-wing
orientation. Third, a ‘debt crisis’ hypothesis suggests that
rising levels of public debt will necessitate reductions in
government spending, to avoid increasing rates of debt
service payments, a position often articulated by politi-
cians pursuing deep cuts as an austerity strategy [2,16]. The
prominence of healthcare within government spending
makes it an obvious target for governments that concen-
trate their efforts on cuts rather than tax rises.
A fourth major hypothesis in the political economy lit-
erature focuses on the role of external factors, such as
international ﬁnancial institutions (IFIs). Historically, IFIs
have advocated for ‘structural adjustment programmes’,
which include privatization, liberalization, and austerity
policies, privileging conditions that facilitate private-sector
investment [17–19]. The involvement of the International
Monetary Fund has been identiﬁed as a major determi-
nant of reductions in healthcare budgets, with its policy
prioritising accumulation of reserves [20,21]. In Eastern
Europe, countries that borrowed from the IMF had 8%
greater cuts to government spending [22]. Across 135
countries, between 1996 and 2006 non-IMF borrowing
countries, on average, increased government spending on
health by $0.45 for every $1 of donor aid while IMF  bor-
rowing countries increased health spending by only $0.01
for every additional dollar [23]. The IMF  has historically
encouraged reductions in social protection spending by
increasing co-payments for care [24]. In Europe during the
Great Recession, external pressure has come from a tri-
partite coalition of the European Central Bank, European
Commission, and International Monetary Fund. In Greece,
for example, conditionalities of troika bailout packages
included a restriction of public health spending to less than
6% of GDP. Hence, an alternative hypothesis is that pres-
sure from international ﬁnancial institutions may  account
for a greater propensity to pursue cuts and, within them,
to concentrate reductions in the healthcare sector.
In this paper, we test each of these alternative
hypotheses about government budgetary changes using
multivariate cross-national statistical models and data
from 27 EU countries between 1995 and 2011. First, we
assess whether healthcare reductions were a direct result
of economic recessions by modelling annual changes to
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Change in GDP (PPP, per capita, real) across country-specific recessionary period
Fig. 1. Change in GDP and change in government spending on health across country-speciﬁc recession and austerity periods. Cross-national variations in
healthcare spending, by country-speciﬁc recession and austerity periods, 24 EU countries and the United States. Notes: Source: WHO  Health expenditure
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database 2013 edition, EuroStat 2013 edition. Recessionary- and austerit
eﬁned  as declining GDP (adjusted for inﬂation and purchasing-power) 
adjusted for inﬂation and purchasing-power) in consecutive years. Data 
raphic.  The US is included in this ﬁgure as a comparison but is not includ
DP per capita, cumulative GDP declines, and changes
n tax revenues per capita [7,29,30]. Second, we  test the
isibility hypothesis by measuring whether government
pending on health is protected or targeted in periods of
tate retrenchment [12]. To measure state retrenchment
e constructed a novel indicator of austerity, which we
eﬁned as a reduction in total government expenditure,
djusted for inﬂation and purchasing-power between two
onsecutive years [8,10], which we cross-validated with
MF  codings of ﬁscal austerity [25]. Second, to test whether
ariations in healthcare spending could be accounted for by
iffering party ideology, as has been shown in relation to
ublic health policy [26], we assessed whether governing
arties with Left or Right orientations were more likely to
mplement healthcare cuts than Centre parties [14,27,28].
hird, we tested the debt crisis hypothesis by examining
hether countries with high levels of public debts as a frac-
ion of GDP are more likely to reduce healthcare spending
25,26]. Finally, we examined the international institutions
ypothesis by measuring whether exposure to IMF lend-
ng increases the likelihood of healthcare austerity among
ecipients of bailout packages [29].
. Data and method
Data on public healthcare expenditure were taken
rom EuroStat’s 2013 general government expenditure
ata on health [31]. Metrics of political ideology, derived
rom an assessment of the economic policy of governing
arties contained within their manifestos, were assem-
led from the World Bank Political Institutions database
012 [27]. If economic decisions made by the executive
eviate from party manifestos then the coding followss are deﬁned in detail for each country in Web  Appendix 1. Recession is
cutive years. Austerity is deﬁned as declining government expenditure
all populations (i.e., Malta, Luxembourg, and Cyprus) excluded from the
e other analyses in this paper.
the party leader rather than the manifesto. IMF  program
participation was coded using data from the IMF’s Mon-
itoring of Fund Arrangements database (MONA), using
harmonised sources of archived 1993–2003 and current
data (2002–2013) [32]. These data included receipt of
Stand-By Arrangements (short-term allocations for bal-
ance of payments problems) and Extended Fund Facilities
(medium-term allocations for balance of payments prob-
lems) [33]. In the 2007–2011 period many of these
programmes were coupled with lending from the Euro-
pean Central Bank, although the conditions of the packages
were formalised in the IMF  arrangements so were included
in our metrics of program participation. Web  Appendix 2
provides summary statistics for all variables.
To evaluate putative economic, social and political
determinants of changes in healthcare spending we used
multivariate statistical models [34]. As the recent reces-
sion was a Europe-wide phenomenon, we evaluated both
within- and between-country differences in responses to
austerity so as to assess cross-national variations. When
a large proportion of observations do not exhibit change
on a key explanatory variable (i.e., where there is rel-
atively little within-country variation) the ﬁxed effects
modelling framework restricts the sample to only those
observations that change value within the panel [35]. This
reduces the estimation sample to only 8 countries with
respect to exposure to IMF  lending. Further ﬁxed-effects
estimates magnify the relative importance of independent
variables with potential measurement error [36,37]. Thus,
to maximise the available variation, random-effects are
the preferred statistical approach for testing hypotheses to
avoid risk of spurious results from inﬂating the contribu-
tion of measurement error to the total variation. We  tested
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the validity of the model speciﬁcation using a Hausman test
and, as a robustness check, correct for spatial correlation
using time dummies and further adjust for country-year
time trends.
Thus, our statistical model is as follows:
Healthi,t = ˛i + ˇ1GDPi,t + ˇ2TAXi,t−1 + ˇ2Debti,t−1
+ ˇ3Lefti,t + ˇ4Righti,t + ˇ5Austerityi,t
+ ˇ6IMFi,t + i + εi,t (1)
Here i is country and t is year.  denotes the annual
change, as a ﬁrst-difference. Because we are interested
in both the probability and also the extent of healthcare
austerity, we  modelled health spending both as a binary
measure of public healthcare austerity and also as a mea-
sure of the annual change in public healthcare spending,
adjusted for inﬂation and purchasing-power in USD. GDP
is the annual change in Gross Domestic Product (adjusted
for inﬂation and purchasing-power parity). This allows us
to test whether annual change in GDP impacted health-
care spending during the most recent crisis. Tax is change
in the per capita tax revenue, adjusted for inﬂation and
purchasing-power. Debt is total government debt in the
previous year, measured as a percentage of GDP, which has
been a major feature in debates on ﬁscal consolidation [38].
Left and Right are dummies for the political ideology of
the governing party with Centre as the baseline. Austerity
measures whether the government reduced total gov-
ernment expenditure, i.e., periods of state retrenchment,
adjusting for inﬂation and purchasing-power, between two
years. IMF  is a dummy  variable for whether a country was
exposed to an active lending programme. It is coded 1 in the
year after the agreement with the IMF  has been established,
allowing for a lag in implementing ﬁscal consolidation, and
remains 1 as long as the agreement continues [39].  is a
random effect, reﬂecting the pooled effect of within- and
between-country variation. Missing observations are pri-
marily found among new member states in the political
ideology variable (Missing N = 120); thus, following pre-
vious analyses, missing data has been omitted from the
analysis rather than imputed [40].
Because the recipients of the IMF  loans are more
likely to be experiencing economic downturns, there is
potential for a residual, unobserved selection bias in our
model, even after correcting for annual GDP changes and
other economic controls. Hence, in a subsequent step we
constructed a statistical counterfactual using a ‘control
function’ approach (also known as the two-stage Heckman
correction model) that in the ﬁrst stage assesses the hazard
of entering into an IMF  lending programme, then corrects
for this hazard in a second stage based on an a priori identi-
ﬁcation of determinants of IMF  exposure [29,41,42]. These
models are used to correct for selection bias in the treat-
ment variables, using a previously validated speciﬁcation in
political economy models of the effect of the IMF  exposure
on government spending [22]. All models include robust
and clustered standard errors by country, to reﬂect non-
independence of country sampling. Models were estimated
using STATA v12.1. To visualise the predicted probabilitiescy 115 (2014) 1–8
of healthcare austerity under alternative policy scenarios
we use the STATA module CLARIFY using 1000 repeated
draws from the probability distribution [43].
3. Results
3.1. Cross-national determinants of changes in
healthcare spending
Table 1 shows the results of our statistical models.
Turning ﬁrst to the economic factors, although the size
of the recession is initially signiﬁcant when  ˛ = 0.05, after
adjusting for tax revenues the effect disappears, indicating
that the effect of recession operates through the govern-
ment’s revenue base. Neither annual change in GDP nor
levels of public debt as a fraction of GDP was signiﬁ-
cantly associated with changes in health spending (p = 0.31
and p = 0.38, respectively). In contrast, changes in tax rev-
enue per capita were a strongly signiﬁcant determinant
of healthcare spending changes. Each US $100 decrease
in amount the government received through tax revenues
was  associated with a US $2.72 per capita fall in healthcare
expenditure (95% CI: $1.03–4.41).
As shown in Table 1, the political afﬁliation of the gov-
erning party was not statistically signiﬁcantly correlated
with reduced healthcare expenditure. Whether the gov-
erning parties were of the Right (p = 0.55) or Left (p = 0.34)
political orientation measured by World Bank metrics had
no effect on healthcare budgetary changes as compared
with Centre parties, both before and after adjusting for
ﬂuctuations in the tax revenue base.
We also tested whether changes in healthcare spend-
ing reﬂected the decision to pursue austerity in total
government spending. We  found that governments that
implemented reductions in total government spending also
signiﬁcantly reduced healthcare expenditures, on average,
by US $64.4 per year, although there was signiﬁcant varia-
tion in the magnitude of these declines (95% CI: −$37.2 to
−$91.6).
3.2. Effects of international ﬁnancial institutions
We  next tested whether receipt of International Mon-
etary Fund loans had an effect on healthcare budgets and
on generalised budget reductions. We  observed that IMF
recipient countries were 3.9-times more likely to make
healthcare cuts than non-IMF recipient countries (95% CI:
1.95–7.74). However, among countries that cut total gov-
ernment spending, those receiving IMF  loans were 28%
more likely to cut healthcare budgets than non-IMF recipi-
ents that also pursued austerity in response to recession
(95% CI: 0.13–0.44). IMF  recipients also tended to make
larger cuts to healthcare budgets, averaging about 50%
more than non-IMF recipient countries. Overall, countries
receiving IMF  loans reduced per capita healthcare expendi-
ture by an additional US $44.8 (95% CI: −$6.28 to −$83.3),
even after correcting for the severity of recessions and pub-
lic debt.
To put these effects in perspective, we decomposed our
statistical model to estimate budgetary scenarios under
alternative exposures to the IMF, as depicted in Fig. 2.
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Table  1
Economic and political determinants of annual change in health spending among 27 EU countries, 1995–2011.
Covariates Annual change in health spendinga
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
$10 annual increase in GDPa 0.28* (0.10) 0.23* (0.097) 0.21* (0.096) 0.13 (0.083) 0.12 (0.082) 0.089 (0.0085)
$100  annual increase in tax
revenuea
4.04** (1.10) 4.11** (1.07) 3.29** (0.79) 2.96** (0.83) 2.72** (0.82)
Public  debt as percentage of
GDP in the previous year
−0.041 (0.14) −0.021 (0.14) −0.075 (0.14) −0.17 (0.19)
Implemented austerity in
current year
−63.3** (11.7) −61.5** (11.7) −64.4** (13.3)
IMF  bailout active in current
year
−29.3* (13.1) −44.8* (18.7)
Left  governing partyb −14.0 (14.4)
Right  governing partyb −10.8 (17.7)
Country-years 409 397 391 391 391 339
Countries 27 27 27 27 27 27
R2 0.090 0.13 0.12 0.23 0.24 0.26
Source: EuroStat 2013 edition, IMF  MONA 2013 edition, World Bank Political Institutions Database 2013 edition.
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for repeated observations: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01. IMF  bailouts include Stand-by Arrangements, usually short-
term  lending to states to cover the effect of unanticipated shocks, and Extended Fund Facilities, which are usually medium- or long-term lending programmes
aimed at overcoming weaknesses in the national economy which may  have precipitated or exacerbated the shock.
a Units in per capita, constant purchasing-power-parity USD.
b Baseline category is Centre. Taken from the World Bank Political Institutions d
the  economic ideology of the governing party (or the party whose leader is head 
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Somic determinants. Notes: Density estimates are based on the models
eported in Table 2 and Web  Appendix 3. Variance around the means
ere estimated from 1000 repeated draws of the sample probability dis-
ributions using STATA module CLARIFY.
irst, we estimate the probability of healthcare austerity
iven the mean level of covariates described above using a
ogistic regression model (see Web  Appendix 3) [43]. The
alues reported in Table 2 are the predicted probabilities of
able 2
robability of healthcare austerity controlling for economic and political
eterminants, 27 EU countries, 1995–2011.
Probability of healthcare
austerity (95% CI)
No austerity or IMF  0.15 (0.064–0.27)
Austerity but no IMF  0.53 (0.29–0.74)
IMF  and austerity 0.79 (0.56–0.94)
otes: All other variables (including annual change in GDP, change in tax
evenue, level of public debt, and political ideology of governing party)
ere set at their mean values. Probabilities estimated using Clarify for
TATA. Results from full model in Web  Appendix 3.atabase, Left governing party and Right governing party are measures of
of a coalition) derived from party manifestos.
healthcare austerity (with conﬁdence intervals) given spe-
ciﬁc values of all other covariates in the model. Fig. 2 plots
the uncertainty around our predicted probabilities given
different levels of exposure to the IMF, austerity, and reces-
sion. As shown in the ﬁgure, IMF  borrowing countries had
an 80% probability of reducing healthcare spending (95% CI:
0.56–0.94); non-IMF borrowing countries that made gen-
eral government cuts had an 52% probability of reducing
healthcare spending (95% CI: 0.29–0.74), even after adjus-
ting for the annual change in GDP and debt as a fraction
of GDP; and countries that pursued general government
stimulus had an 15% probability of reducing healthcare
spending (95% CI: 0.06–0.27).
3.3. Comparing differences in healthcare budgetary
changes within and between nations
To provide further insight into the mechanisms under-
lying reductions in healthcare expenditure, we restrict the
model to ‘within-country’ variation, country ﬁxed-effects
(Web Appendix 4). A Hausman test comparing random and
ﬁxed effects models reveals that none of the coefﬁcients
signiﬁcantly change apart from those with low-levels of
within country variation (i.e., principally the IMF  par-
ticipation) and those where the country-speciﬁc mean
is operationally ambiguous (i.e., political ideology) (Web
Appendix 5). This model revealed two important differ-
ences in within-country dynamics. First, while the absolute
level of debt is not a statistically signiﬁcant determinant
of healthcare reductions between countries, higher lev-
els of debt relative to the historical mean are signiﬁcantly
associated with healthcare cuts between 1995 and 2011.
Each 1% rise in the level of public debt over the mean
level is associated with a US $1.87 decline in healthcare
spending (95% CI: −$1.06 to −$2.74). However, neither
actual debt service as a fraction of GDP nor the absolute
level were statistically signiﬁcant factors (p = 0.55, p = 0.15,
alth Poli6 A. Reeves et al. / He
respectively). Second, after correcting for the decision to
reduce healthcare spending, the estimated effect of the IMF
is insigniﬁcant. This evidence is consistent with a mecha-
nism whereby, within countries, much of the association
between receipt of IMF  loans and healthcare spending is
mediated by an increased likelihood of pursuing austerity.
3.4. Testing potential selection bias
Treatment, i.e., seeking and receiving an IMF  loan, is
non-random. As such it was necessary to consider the
potential for confounding by indication, whereby there
were unobserved factors that predisposed countries to seek
IMF  loans that would have also driven reductions in health-
care spending. To address this, in a ﬁrst step we  used a
“control function”, based on a previously validated model
of the determinants of IMF  participation (Web Appendix 6)
[22,44]. Vreeland’s work on entry into an IMF  programme
highlights the importance of three factors: Debt servicing,
deﬁcit, and foreign reserves [29]. Debt servicing is excluded
from this model because it is consistently insigniﬁcant. We
also include a measure of change in the level of GDP and the
level of GDP, adjusted for inﬂation and purchasing-power,
to capture the impact of economic shocks on selection into
the IMF  and also the observed association between smaller
incomes and IMF  lending. After controlling for the hazard of
participating in an IMF  lending program, we found that the
estimated associations of the IMF  with healthcare spend-
ing were a reduction of US $49.5 (95% CI: −$2.56 to −$96.5),
consistent with the random effects model speciﬁcations.
3.5. Robustness checks
To test the robustness of our statistical models, we
included time trends and time dummies in the models and
found no qualitative or signiﬁcant change in the model.
Additionally to check the inﬂuence of potential outliers, we
removed Greece from the models (Web Appendix 7) and
re-ran models excluding standardised residuals greater
than two (see Web  Appendix 8). In both cases, none of
the results was qualitatively or signiﬁcantly changed. In a
further check, we re-estimated our basic model by mea-
suring the depth of recession (from peak-to-trough) to
include the entire period from 2007 to 2011 and found
no signiﬁcant changes (Web Appendix 9). To investi-
gate whether budgetary deﬁcits, rather than overall debt
levels, factored more prominently into budget decision-
making, we added a measure of the deﬁcit and found
that it was also insigniﬁcant (p = 0.89). We  also tested
whether public debt measured per capita, rather than as
a fraction of GDP, altered our results. We  found that our
results were not qualitatively changed and that public debt
(per capita, adjusted for inﬂation and purchasing-power)
remained insigniﬁcant (p = 0.77). We  also found that when
we included annual change in government spending in
the model, rather than a binary measure of austerity, our
results did not qualitatively change as the government
spending variable remained signiﬁcant at the  ˛ = 0.05 level
(p = 0.034) (see Web  Appendix 10). In a further step, we
re-estimated our models using the IMF’s binary indicator
of ﬁscal consolidation which only covers pre-recessionarycy 115 (2014) 1–8
periods, observing that effect sizes were statistically indis-
tinguishable from our dating of austerity (Test of effect
homogeneity: 2(1) = 1.64, p = 0.20) [25].
As a speciﬁcity test, we restricted the outcome variable
to government spending on health through social health
insurance schemes, which would be less inﬂuenced by
intentional spending reduction choices (austerity) (Web
Appendix 11) [7]. We found that the association of aus-
terity was insigniﬁcant (−US$7.52, p = 0.21), and that both
per capita tax revenues (p = 0.43) and exposure to IMF
(p = 0.53) had no effect in the context of low power, as
data were missing for Romania and Latvia, two austerity
countries. Similarly, when we included a measure of the
change in the level of private healthcare expenditure to
capture the extent to which patients transitioned away
from the private sector and turned toward the public sector,
as witnessed in Greece and Ireland, (and where spending
automatically increased the public sector’s health spending
during economic downturns) we ﬁnd that our measure of
austerity remains signiﬁcant (−US$69.29, p < 0.001), while
exposure to the IMF  (p = 0.45) had no effect. Again this vari-
ation in the IMF  is likely due to missing data from Romania
and Latvia (Web Appendix 12). Finally we estimate a ﬁxed-
effects logistic regression model to test the robustness of
our random-effects estimates used in Table 2 and Fig. 2
and ﬁnd that, similar to our linear model, the results are
not qualitatively changed (see Web  Appendix 13).
4. Conclusion
Our ﬁndings reveal ﬁve important points about the
political economy of healthcare budget choices. First, we
reject the ‘visibility hypothesis’, that proposes that health-
care sectors may  be protected during periods of austerity.
In contrast, we  observed that much of the burden of bud-
get cuts is being concentrated in the healthcare sector,
particularly in countries exposed to IMF  lending agree-
ments. Second, we  show that cuts to healthcare spending
are not an inevitable consequence of recessions as neither
the annual change in GDP per capita or the cumulative
GDP loss were associated with such cuts. Third, we also
reject the ‘party hypothesis’, observing that the ideology
of governing parties had no effect on changes to health-
care spending. Fourth, although we ﬁnd little support for
the ‘debt crisis’ hypothesis, as levels of debt as a frac-
tion of GDP are not associated with spending changes,
we did observe within-countries that increasing debt, irre-
spective of its level, was linked to expenditure reductions.
Fifth, consistent with data from prior historical recessions,
receipt of loans from the IMF  was signiﬁcantly associated
with the decision to implement large cuts to the health
sector (‘international institutions’ hypothesis). Finally, we
also observed that social insurance systems were less sus-
ceptible to austerity policies and tax revenue ﬂuctuations
than were countries with tax-ﬁnanced healthcare systems,
although social insurance systems did appear to be more
susceptible to declines in GDP per capita [7].Our study has several important limitations. First,
due to lack of available data, we were unable to dif-
ferentiate the types of healthcare spending reduction
measures implemented in response to recession. Some
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pending reductions may  be desirable, such as substitu-
ion of generics for branded pharmaceuticals. The European
bservatory on Health Systems and Policies has found
 diverse set of responses, including indiscriminate cuts
n Greece to introducing user fees and co-payments for
ensioners in Ireland, to restricting access to care for immi-
rants in Spain [45]. Second, although we have attempted
o control for change in the levels of private sector health-
are spending, where the private sector is large there may
e an ‘automatic stabilizer’ effect. Thus, in Greece and
reland, patients who previously used the private sector
urned to the public sector, automatically increasing the
ublic sector’s spending during the economic downturn.
s this automatic rise in health spending has tended to
ccur in some of the economies worst hit by the crisis in
urope, the data on healthcare expenditures would tend
o understate the magnitude of austerity observed in this
tudy. Third, in some countries, such as the UK, policy-
akers have ostensibly ‘ring-fenced’ healthcare spending.
owever, a decision to hold health budgets constant in the
ontext of inﬂation amounts to a net decline in real terms.
ur model investigated spending changes in real terms;
uture work may  be needed to assess potential differences
etween nominal and real spending to better understand
he political economy of austerity and intentionality of pol-
cy choices [46].
Future work is needed to investigate the health effects of
udgetary reductions or their downstream effects on pub-
ic health spending. In Greece, public sector cuts have been
ssociated with increased waiting times, reduced accessi-
ility to local services [47], and shortages of health-care
upplies [48], all contributing to a reduction in the num-
er of people who are utilizing healthcare services. There
as also been a concurrent rise in the number of people
sing street clinics run by NGOs [47]. And yet, because
reece is not a lone case, more research is needed to
ully understand the impact of healthcare austerity on
opulation health in other contexts [49]. Further, while
ur control function model accounted for the non-random
ssignment of some countries to treatment (i.e., IMF  lend-
ng) and case studies of IMF  intervention have already
escribed the mechanisms by which exposure to the IMF
eads to reduced health spending, future research trac-
ng the decision-making processes by which IMF-lending
eads to reductions in spending on health might reveal
he sources of such policy initiatives. For example, gov-
rnments may  be using the cover of the IMF  to make
deologically motivated changes in health policy [50,51].
Contrary to widespread perceptions, our ﬁndings do
ot support the notion that the pursuit of austerity is
etermined by the ideology of the governing party after
ontrolling for economic factors. There was no signiﬁcant
ssociation of political party, whether Left or Right, with
he decision to reduce healthcare budgets. Alternatively,
e ﬁnd that receipt of IMF  loans is associated with cuts
o healthcare spending. Countries which borrowed from
he IMF  were also less likely to protect healthcare budg-
ts when they decided to implement austerity measures.
aken together, these observations may  offer some expla-
ation for the growing disenchantment with democracy
ow apparent in some European countries.
[cy 115 (2014) 1–8 7
Acknowledgements
We  gratefully acknowledge Jonathan Cylus, Philipa
Mdladovsky, and Josep Figueras of the European Observa-
tory on Health Systems and Policies for helpful comments
on various drafts of this paper.
Conﬂicts of interest: We declare that we no conﬂicts of
interest.
Funding: AR DS: This study was carried out with
ﬁnancial support from the Commission of the European
Communities, Grant Agreement no. 278511. The study does
not necessarily reﬂect the Commission’s views and in no
way anticipates the Commission’s future policy in this area.
Appendix A. Web  Appendix
Supplementary data associated with this article can be
found, in the online version, at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.
healthpol.2013.11.008.
References
[1] Rehn O. In: Commission E, editor. Letter to Europe’s Finance Minis-
ters, 13 Feb 2013. Brussels: European Commission; 2013.
[2] Reinhart CM,  Rogoff KS. Growth in a time of debt. American Economic
Review 2010;100(2):573–8.
[3] Wilensky HL. The welfare state and equality: structural and ideo-
logical roots of public expenditures. Berkeley; London: University of
California Press; 1975.
[4] NBER Business Cycle dating Committee. In: Hall R, Feldstein M,
Frankel J, Gordon R, Poterba J, Romer D, editors. Determination of
the December 2007 peak in economic activity. Business Cycle Dating
Committee, National Bureau of Economic Research: NBER; 2008.
[5] Spilimbergo A, Symansky S, Schindler M.  Fiscal multipliers. Wash-
ington: IMF  Staff Position Note: IMF; 2009.
[6] IMF. World economic outlook: coping with high debt and sluggish
growth. Washington, D.C.: IMF; 2012.
[7] Cylus J, Mladovsky P, McKee M.  Is there a statistical relationship
between economic crises and changes in government health expen-
diture growth? An analysis of twenty-four European countries.
Health Services Research 2012;47(6):2204–24.
[8] Reeves A, Basu S, McKee M,  Meissner C, Stuckler D. Does investment
in  the health sector promote or inhibit economic growth? Globaliza-
tion Health 2013;9(43).
[9] Ministry of Finance, editor. From the Budget Bill for 2011: Budget
Statement. Stockholm: Government Ofﬁces of Sweden; 2010 (Oct).
10] Reeves A, Basu S, McKee M,  Marmot M, Stuckler D. Austere or not?
UK coalition government budgets and health inequalities. Journal of
the Royal Society of Medicine 2013;106(11):432–6.
11] IMF. Will it hurt? Macroeconomic effects of ﬁscal consolidation. In:
World Economic Outlook. Washington, DC: IMF; 2010. p. 93–124.
12] Stuckler D, Basu S. The Body Economic: why austerity kills? London:
Penguin; 2013.
13] Reeves A, Stuckler D. Crowd-out of defence and health spending: is
Israel different from other industrialised nations? Israel Journal of
Health Policy Research 2013;2(1):14.
14] Pierson P. Dismantling the welfare state?: Reagan, Thatcher, and the
politics of retrenchment. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press;
1994.
15] Kopp MS,  Stauder A, Purebl G, Janszky I, Skrabski Ã. Work stress
and mental health in a changing society. Eur J Public Health
2008;18(3):238–44.
16] Osborne G. A New Economic Model. Mais Lecture, London; 2010.
17] Burgard SA, Brand JE, House JS. Perceived job insecurity and
worker health in the United States. Social Science and Medicine
2009;69(5):777–85.
18] Fergusson DM,  John Horwood L, Woodward LJ. Unemployment and
psychosocial adjustment in young adults: causation or selection?
Social Science and Medicine 2001;53(3):305–20.
19] D’Souza RM,  Strazdins L, Broom DH, Rodgers B, Berry HL. Work
demands, job insecurity and sickness absence from work. How pro-
ductive is the new, ﬂexible labour force? Australian and New Zealand
Journal of Public Health 2006;30(3):205–12.
alth Poli
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[8 A. Reeves et al. / He
20] Kim IH, Muntaner C, Khang YH, Paek D, Cho SI. The relationship
between nonstandard working and mental health in a representative
sample of the South Korean population. Social Science and Medicine
2006;63(3):566–74.
21] Stuckler D, Basu S. The International Monetary Fund’s effects on
global health: before and after the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis. International
Journal of Health Services 2009;39(4):771–81.
22] Stuckler D, King LP, Basu S. International Monetary Fund pro-
grams and tuberculosis outcomes in post-communist countries. PLoS
Medicine 2008;5(7):1079–90.
23] Anderson RN, Minin˜o AM,  Hoyert DL, Rosenberg HM. In: Reports
NVS, editor. Comparability of cause of death between ICD-9and
ICD-10: preliminary estimates. Hyattsville, Maryland: CDC; 2001.
p.  1–32.
24] Montgomery SM,  Cook DG, Bartley MJ,  Wadsworth MEJ. Unemploy-
ment pre-dates symptoms of depression and anxiety resulting in
medical consultation in young men. International Journal of Epi-
demiology 1999;28(1):95–100.
25] Devries P, Guajardo J, Leigh D, Pescatori A. A new action-based
dataset of ﬁscal consolidation. IMF  Working Paper 2011;11:128.
26] Mackenbach JP, McKee M.  Social-democratic government and
health policy in Europe: a quantitative analysis. International
Journal of Health Services: Planning, Administration, Evaluation
2013;43(3):389–413.
27] Beck T, Clarke G, Groff A, Keefer P, Walsh P. New tools in comparative
political economy: The Database of Political Institutions. World Bank
Economic Review 2001;15(1):165–76.
28] Hacker JS, Pierson P. Winner-take-all politics: public policy, political
organization, and the precipitous rise of top incomes in the United
States. Politics & Society 2010;38(2):152–204.
29] Przeworski A, Vreeland JR. The effect of IMF  programs on economic
growth. Journal of Development Economics 2000;62(2):385–421.
30] Stuckler D, Basu S, McKee M,  Suhrcke M.  Responding to the eco-
nomic crisis: a primer for public health professionals. Journal of
Public Health 2010;32(3):298–306.
31] EUROSTAT. General Government expenditure by function. Luxem-
bourg: EUROSTAT; 2012.
32] IMF. Monitoring of Fund Arrangements (MONA). Washington, D.C.:
IMF; 2013.
33] IMF. The IMF  and Europe. Washington, D.C.: IMF; 2013.
34] Keegan C, Thomas S, Normand C, Portela C. Measuring recessionseverity and its impact on healthcare expenditure. International
Journal of Health Care Finance and Economics 2013;13(2):139–55.
35] Heckman JJ. The incidental parameters problem and the problem of
initial condition in estimating a discrete time-discrete data stochas-
tic  process. In: Manski CF, McFadden DL, editors. Structural analysis
[
[cy 115 (2014) 1–8
of discrete data and econometric applications. Cambridge, MA:  MIT
Press; 1981.
36] Griliches Z, Hausman JA. Errors in variables in panel data. Journal of
Econometrics 1986;31(1):93–118.
37] Griliches Z. Errors in variables and other unobservables. Economet-
rica 1974;42(6):971–98.
38] WHO. Outcome document for the high-level meeting on Health sys-
tems in times of global economic crisis: an update of the situation in
the  WHO  European Region. C¸ es¸ me Izmir, Turkey: WHO; 2013.
39] Copelovitch MS.  Master or servant? Common agency and the
political economy of IMF  lending. International Studies Quarterly
2010;54(1):49–77.
40] Stuckler D, Basu S, Suhrcke M,  Coutts A, McKee M.  The public health
effect of economic crises and alternative policy responses in Europe:
an  empirical analysis. Lancet 2009;374(9686):315–23.
41] Vreeland JR. IMF program compliance: aggregate index versus policy
speciﬁc research strategies. Review of International Organizations
2006;1(4):359–78.
42] Dreher A, Sturm JE, Vreeland JR. Development aid and inter-
national politics: does membership on the UN Security Council
inﬂuence World Bank decisions? Journal of Development Economics
2009;88(1):1–18.
43] King G, Tomz M,  Wittenberg J. Making the most of statistical analy-
ses: improving interpretation and presentation. American Journal of
Political Science 2000;44:341–55.
44] Vreeland JR. Institutional determinants of IMF  agreements. Leitner
Program Working Papers 2001;6:1–32.
45] Mladovsky P, Srivastava D, Cylus J, Karanikolos M, Evetovits T,
Thomson S, et al. Health policy in the ﬁnancial crisis. Eurohealth
2012;18(1):3–6.
46] Mladovsky P, Srivastava D, Cylus J, Karanikolos M,  Evetovits T, Thom-
son S, et al.Health policy responses to the ﬁnancial crisis in Europe.
2012.
47] Kentikelenis A, Karanikolos M,  Papanicolas I, Basu S, McKee M,  Stuck-
ler D. Health effects of ﬁnancial crisis: omens of a Greek tragedy. The
Lancet 2011;378(9801):1457–8.
48] Kentikelenis A, Karanikolos M,  Papanicolas I, Basu S, McKee M,  Stuck-
ler D. Health and the ﬁnancial crisis in Greece? Authors’ reply. The
Lancet 2012;379(9820):1002.
49] Skrondal A, Rabe-Hesketh S. Generalized latent variable modeling:
multilevel, longitudinal, and structural equation models. Boca Raton,
FL; London: Chapman & Hall/CRC; 2004.
50] Woods N. The globalizers: the IMF, the World Bank, and their bor-
rowers. Ithaca, NY; London: Cornell University Press; 2006.
51] George AL, Bennett A. Case studies and theory development in the
social sciences. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT  Press; 2005.
